Your call could not be completed as dialled: why truth 

does not speak to power in global health

Comment on “Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power in global health” by Bump, Jesse B
Your call could not be completed as dialled: why truth 
does not speak to power in global health
Comment on “Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power in global health”
Jesse B Bump*
Abstract
This article contends that legitimacy in the exercise of power comes from the consent of those subject to it. In 
global health, this implies that the participation of poor country citizens is required for the legitimacy of major 
actors and institutions. But a review of institutions and processes suggests that this participation is limited or 
absent. Particularly because of the complex political economy of non-communicable diseases, this participation is 
essential to the future advancement of global health and the legitimacy of its institutions. More analysis of power 
and legitimacy provides one entry point for fostering progress.
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If poor or otherwise marginalized people are the ultimate beneficiaries of efforts in global health, then it would stand to reason that related actors and institutions would 
be responsive to their demands. At the very least, one would 
hope that the major powers in global health would have 
formal legitimacy to act on behalf of these groups. This is not 
the case in general and is an acute problem in many low- and 
middle-income countries because of weaknesses in national 
governance systems and inabilities to contest the influence 
of international actors. Many analysts have tried to advance 
global health by commenting critically on decisions, policies, 
and institutions, but the underlying issues of legitimacy and 
the exercise of power have escaped the attention of all but a 
very few. Power and legitimacy are central foci of political 
economy analysis and Shiffman’s call (1) to analyze these 
phenomena is well-founded for the reason that he identifies—
namely to question whether power in its epistemic and 
normative forms is justly held. In this article, I emphasize the 
importance of these analyses by showing how the exercise 
of power is now disconnected from the voices of those who 
bear its consequences. Further, I argue that the analysis of 
power is central to maximizing the humanitarian impact 
sought by those engaged in global health activities. This 
position is related to a general argument for more political 
economy analysis in global health made by myself and 
colleagues (2).
A core question of legitimacy in the use of power is whether 
it is used in the right way to do the right things—a statement 
that immediately raises questions about how “right” would 
be adjudicated. These questions have broad answers in many 
aspects of modern life. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and other 
Enlightenment thinkers conceptualized the “social contract” 
to articulate the citizen-state relationship that now underpins 
modern nations (3–5). In short, the social contract refers to 
the assignment of some powers to the state, meaning that 
these powers are relinquished by individuals, and in exchange 
the state protects the remaining rights of individuals. As I have 
observed elsewhere, government health systems comprise a 
prominent part of the modern social contract (6,7). In health, 
as in other areas, citizens influence state policies, as by voting 
in democratic countries, and thereby have some participation 
in the decisions about what constitutes the right use of power 
and the right objectives. This participation, or at least consent, 
conveys legitimacy. This legitimacy can be threatened by 
corruption, co-option by interest groups, oppression of a 
minority by the majority, or other problems. 
But this social contract mechanism does not legitimize power 
in global health because most activities fall outside the realm 
of single nations. Recipient citizens and the providers of 
services are often at considerable remove and are not well-
linked by any mechanism of representation or accountability. 
The actions of bilateral agencies may have some connection 
to the demands of their own citizens, but their responsiveness 
to the wishes of those to whom they ostensibly provide 
services is far weaker. 
If the primary means for establishing legitimacy within a 
nation is inapplicable, then the next sphere of interest is 
mechanisms between nations. Most of the international 
agencies date to the post-World War II period and were not 
designed around an ideal of globalized democracy in general, 
nor with respect to legitimacy in health in particular. The 
United Nations (UN) was designed to promote stability by 
avoiding conflict between the major powers and isolating 
it in more limited settings. Although the UN acknowledges 
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the idea of democracy in its General Assembly (one country, 
one vote), it reserves many important powers for its Security 
Council whose permanent members were allies in World 
War II1. The International Monetary Fund was designed to 
reduce economic conflict by establishing rules on currency 
manipulation and providing means to settle balance of 
payment matters. Its governance is based on contributed 
capital, which favors wealthier nations; the World Bank has 
the same structure. The UN agency most directly concerned 
with global health is the World Health Organization (WHO), 
but its ostensibly democratic World Health Assembly has 
been circumvented by rich countries using earmarked 
contributions and other measures to influence activities and 
priorities outside of the voting process. 
The result of these dynamics is the intended beneficiary 
citizens and their governments are not adequately represented 
in global health decision-making, and thus are not fully 
enfranchised in the still-incomplete international version 
of the social contract. This concept of the social contract 
emphasizes the formal political power of governments 
and states, but this is certainly not the only kind of power 
important to global health. 
The legitimacy of actors and institutions in global health 
is further threatened by the absence of agreement about 
the process for making decisions. Even if the ostensible 
beneficiaries are poorly represented in decision-making, 
there could be some legitimacy to be found in transparency of 
process, which in turn might promote fairness. But decision-
making in global health is not transparent, and as Shiffman 
observes, it is not clear how influential actors achieved 
their status nor obvious that it is deserved. With particular 
reference to normative and epistemic power, there are not 
even the rules of a discipline to suggest some standard by 
which conclusions could be reached and decisions could be 
made. This is because global health is not a discipline and 
instead is a practice area, meaning that it is defined by an 
objective rather than by methods. Although there would be 
considerable diversity in specific definitions of global health, 
in my opinion most people would agree that its general goal is 
to promote health and health-related capacities, or maybe to 
advance humanity, to borrow UNICEF’s articulation. 
Despite the harmony that might be inferred from this widely 
recognized goal, underneath lies a chaos of methods in largely 
unproductive competition. Physicians, lawyers, engineers, 
social scientists, natural scientists, and practically every 
other group can contribute to global health. Within each of 
these areas there are processes for guiding the production of 
knowledge, largely based on a form of peer-review. But global 
health lies between all of these areas and does not (yet?) 
have ways to reliably adjudicate disputes between different 
groups using different methods, for instance between 
economists and physicians. How one view gains ascendance 
over another is now a political process that unfolds without 
scrutiny commensurate with its importance. A perhaps worse 
alternative would be hegemony of a single method. Asking 
beneficiary citizens what they want could identify a better 
standard against which alternatives should be weighed, but 
their voices are not prominent in the deliberations of actors 
and institutions in the mainstream of global health. 
Leaving aside uncertain legitimacy in process, I consider 
outcomes next. To the extent that people agree on an issue, 
democratic processes and the exercise of voice become 
less important to outcomes—just because if people agree 
anyway then the decision does not change with increased 
participation. In the first decades of what we now call 
global health, decisions about where to intervene and 
what to do rested almost solely on expert opinion (8,9). 
When targeting infectious diseases this proposition is not 
necessarily unreasonable because very few people—if any—
want to contract them and in the early years there were far 
fewer viable interventions from which to choose. But the 
rising burden of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) 
fundamentally changes this proposition because their political 
economy is profoundly different. Exposures linked to NCDs 
reflect industrial interests and therefore represent a contest of 
economic and health interests in many areas, including food, 
firearms, alcohol, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals. Particularly 
in tobacco, it has been demonstrated that rich countries and 
corporate interests have attempted to further subvert the 
decision-making processes of international organizations 
for their own purposes and at the expense of health of poor 
country citizens (10–14).
A central claim of this article is that legitimacy in the exercise 
of power is conferred by the consent of those subjected to 
it. This conviction is based on the philosophy of the social 
contract and in the ethical framework of process fairness 
(15). In global health, this means primarily the citizens of 
poor countries, and especially the marginalized among 
them. However, current arrangements do not foster their 
participation. The analysis of power and legitimacy is one 
helpful way of questioning whether decisions made in global 
health are consistent with the claimed objective of advancing 
the lives of poor country citizens. Identifying the interest 
groups and the sources of their power can suggest ways to 
incorporate more diverse views, and is also a sound approach 
for guarding against co-option of the social contract itself. 
This holds the promise of increasing the alignment of offered 
interventions and the preferences of recipients—greater 
legitimacy that comes from greater participation. 
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Endnotes
1. China’s seat on the Security Council initially belonged to the Republic of 
China but has since been reassigned to the People’s Republic of China.
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